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The Practice of the Commons
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University

This paper is an effort to lay out some of the basics of a language-based,
person-centered, or agentic model of practice for nonprofit organizations,
voluntary action and philanthropy as an extension of the theoretical ideal
type of the commons. (Hardin, 1965; Lohmann, 1989; Lohmann, 1992a;
Lohmann, 1992b; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 1994) As befits a general model
posited as a Weberian ideal type, the argument here is presented at a fairly
high level of generality.
One of the most persistent questions raised by work on the theory of the
commons has been what might be termed the practice question: This
commons notion is all well and good, social work colleagues, nonprofit
managers and others would say, but what does one do to create or sustain a
commons? How is the practice of the commons different from that of an
ordinary nonprofit? What, in other words, are the general practice
implications of this theory? The ultimate context of such questions, of course,
must begin with the tragic trajectory asserted by Garrett Hardin, Mancur
Olson and others and its implications for individual and collective voluntary
action (Hardin, 1968; Olson,1965). If practice in a commons is, more or less
inevitably, to end badly – come to naught, or far worse, produce results
diametrically opposed to one’s intentions – then what’s the point of even
trying? Wouldn’t a proper commitment to contemplation, further study and
inaction be the wiser course?
Fortunately or unfortunately as the case may be, few people attracted to
the third sector are sufficiently fatalistic to actually take such a path of
inaction seriously. In particular, hundreds of years of practical experience
with commons of various types confirm that at least some commons escape
the tragic fate of resource over-utilization, decline and extinction. Further,
the way in which they generally do so is highly instructive: Farmers using a
common pasture, fishermen working a common stream and all others
working with common resources are able to overcome the tragic fate of overutilization through the rather simple means of creating an association of
users and agreeing upon a set of voluntary rules to limit utilization. It is only
when such associations are unable to channel and regulate individual selfinterest that the tragic aspect of commons noted by Hardin comes into play.
Hardin and others are simply wrong, however, in their view that the only
way such agreements can be made workable is through the coercive action of
state or government regulation. This error arises through considering only
the dichotomous options of private or public action.
There is a third alternative of voluntary action on the basis of uncoerced
cooperation of those involved (and backed up by a wide variety of “informal”
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social processes including dialogue, deliberation, mediation, consent,
cooperation, gossip, stigmatizing (“shunning”, etc.) and, even in more extreme
cases, vigilante action.
My initial response to the question of the practice of the commons has
always been: Well, isn't it obvious? But then clearly it must not be obvious, or
people wouldn’t keep asking. I tried previously to spell out a practice model in
my 1992 ARNOVA paper, in which I cast the practice of the commons largely
in terms of the particular mix of American pragmatism, with emphasis on
Deweyian problem solving, democracy and Piercian community. (Lohmann,
1992c) This paper moves in a slightly different direction.
First, a brief digression on word choice: It is my general sense that in an
open society anyone can practice the commons with others – not individually
or alone – in somewhat the same sense that you can, with appropriate
knowledge and preparation, practice religion, taxidermy or gardening. One
can also practice tolerance, fair-play, and patience in much the same manner.
Groups can practice the commons in somewhat the same sense that they can
practice decision-making or problem-solving. In all these cases, there is a
certain underlying repertory of prior knowledge and skill involved, but the
real practice involves the art of just doing it. There is a real lesson for our
increasingly bureaucratized third sector in all of this: practice of the commons
in this sense is less a matter of establishing and following exacting routines
defined by someone’s ideas of “best practices”, policies and procedures or being
guided by principles or “practice method” menus and guidebooks, than it is of
enthusiastically enacting joint lines of action in pursuit of the good life.
This is a very important point that bears directly on the rest of this paper.
Rules or principles may be applied in anticipation or planning leading up to
any actual practice, or in reconsideration and evaluation following it, but
actual practice is enacted as an experience in everyday life, part of what in
the spirit of Habermas and Schutz we might call enacting the life world.
(Habermas, 1984; Schutz, 1973)
It is in this sense that one may speak of practicing the commons or
practice of the commons. I wish to explicitly discourage the expression
practice in the commons which is something of a verbal misnomer, since the
associations, assemblies and social relations that constitute the commons also
form and enact the commons, and are not merely the shells or “structures”
within which commons are to be found. The commons does not designate a
container or structure within which a slice of life happens; rather it is that
slice itself.

Commons Theory Summarized
Before we speak further of the practice of the commons, it is necessary to
briefly summarize commons theory as it relates to the third sector. The core
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of the theory is the ideal type of a commons as a generalized model of third
sector entities, together with the concept of common goods as a third type of
goal, end, outcome or product; one that is distinguishable from both public
and private goods. A commons in its original English common-law usage is a
plot of land not “enclosed” or privately held and available for use by all who
are in proximity to it. For our purposes, this physical space can be seen as
analogous to the social space that opens up to all when groups of people
associate together under certain conditions. These conditions are roughly
those associated in classic social theory with koinonia politike as a political
community without the overarching collective implications of the state as a
dominant protective association, and are often labeled with the muchoverworked term community. In this sense, commons theory refers to
activities, entities, organizations or other social objects characterized by five
basic conditions: uncoerced participation; shared goals; shared resource pools;
a pervasive sense of mutuality, or “us-ness”; and indigenous norms of justice
or fair play.
The origins of my efforts to apply this approach to the third sector were in
dissatisfaction with the negative accents of “failure theory” of nonprofit law
and economics and the approach of defining third sector activity by what it is
not: not market and not political state, “not-for-profit” as the saying goes, and
nongovernmental. (Lohmann, 1989) Commons theory is in this sense is an
attempt to say what third sector action is and also normatively what it ought
to be. In the original statements of the theory (Lohmann, 1989; 1992), I
identified five conditions that define a commons. I am now inclined to see the
first three of these (see the following paragraph) as definitional and to
hypothesize that in a commons the last two will emerge over time as the
group develops.
In order to clarify further the extent and scope of these five elements that
are said to define a commons, and to focus them more directly on the third
sector it is useful to re-label them slightly and suggest that common action
involves (1) voluntary association among three or more people who are not
forced to relate, not enticed by the prospect of personal profit or gain, and are
not intimates of one another in a sexual, emotional or familial daily-routine
sense. (2) Such association is facilitated by an endowment of resources,
whether financially valued assets, collections of valued objects or repertories
of joint actions or some combination. (3) Common associations thus endowed
will generally choose to pursue missions composed of joint or shared
purposes, whether or not such purposes are constructed instrumentally as
goals, ends, outcomes or products. (4) Although they are certainly not the
only forms of human association to do so, such mission-oriented and endowed
associations are nonetheless producers of social capital in various bridging
and bonding forms of mutuality, trust, confidences and the build up of
relational networks. (5) Finally, in order for the meaningful communication
that is the basis of the association, endowment and mission of the commons
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to continue, and for social capital to be produced, the commons must evolve a
moral order built upon shared values and norms.
In sum, a commons is defined by un-coerced participation (association),
shared resources (endowment), shared purposes (mission), mutuality (social
capital) and shared values and norms (moral order). It is a mistake to see
commons in this sense as instruments of production, for not only do they
“produce” common goods in the form of social capital and moral order. Also,
the “means of production” – association, endowment, and mission – are in
themselves ends or products.
It would be a major overstatement to claim that all nonprofit activity
involves commons or the pursuit of commons goods. In particular, one can
note among the present ‘third’ (non-market, nongovernmental) sectors of the
world a broad array of nonprofit firms characterized by distinct products,
quasi-market pricing behavior and incentive-driven organizational activity,
and bureaus, whose principal modus of practice is rule- or policy-based, as
well as blendings of these firms and bureaus, and blendings of all three of
these types with the ideal type of the commons. All of this is to be expected
since market, state and commons are all ideal types.

Koinonia Politike As Practice
In a certain sense, these five dimensions of the commons proscribe what
have always struck me as six fairly obvious principles of practice of the
commons. If you would practice the commons:
1.

Seek out and join with others with whom you wish to engage in
voluntary association, or as we used to say before the label was
co-opted by one such association, common cause.

2.

Identify the mission or purpose you share with them. (Or, if you
prefer, identify a purpose worth sharing and go seeking people
to share it in association with.)

3.

Pool your resources with those with whom you are engaged in
common mission. (Resources in commons theory generally refer
to treasuries of priced resources, collections of “priceless”
(literally not priced) objects and repertories of rituals, routines,
and practices. It is a mistake to view “power” as a resource of
commons; rather power is the measure of the strength of any
resources. E.g. the influence one may exert over others in
commons through various interpersonal practices may be
variously powerful. The same may be said of the information
generated by accounting routines.

4.

Ideally, everyone involved will work hard to develop trust and
build networks of relationships among those with whom you
hold common cause. Much of the contemporary literature on
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social capital describes in considerable detail the ways in which
this process unfolds in commons.
5.

Build a shared, voluntary moral order out of the
understandings, agreed-upon rules and procedures that arise
from these interactions. (A wide range of practice literature
deals with this process. E.g.,the famous “storming, forming,
norming” sequence of group process. By concentrating on the
supposedly “big issues” and generalizable findings, much of
contemporary nonprofit research (particularly surveys) fails to
attend closely to such emergent moral orders, which are in their
very nature, local, particularlistic, and hold relatively little
interest to outsiders not subject to them.)

6.

Reapply any and all of the above as needed.

Bureaucracy is not Common Practice
Like many of you, I am a practitioner of and a product of the existing third
sector. I have spend the past four decades in and around the nonprofit sector
as a planner, organizer, director, staff member, board member, president,
treasurer, volunteer, consultant, trainer, author and donor to the existing
system of nonprofit, nongovernmental organization. Based on that
experience, I have formed a number of impressions of the strengths and
weaknesses of contemporary third sector practice in commons and the other
forms fo nonprofit organization. One of these is that a good deal of the
contemporary third sector in the United States and elsewhere falls far short
of the potentials implied by the model of the commons.
The very first implication of the practice of the commons noted just above
is the manner in which it stands as an implicit critique of much of existing
third-sector practice: The commons model of spontaneous order, voluntary
participation and sharing of means and ends stands in direct contradiction to
the ubiquitous presence of “rational” or “formal” organizations characterized
by conventional, hierarchical chain-of-command, or command and control
bureaucracy or incentive based “delivery” of formal service products or
outputs. It is precisely in this sense that the commons as an ideal type is
contrasted with the business firm and the government bureau. By some
perverse logic or simple failures of imagination, the term “nonprofit
organization” has increasingly come to denote the hierarchical, command and
control formal structure of the nonprofit firm and the hierarchical bureau is
increasingly seen as the normative organizational form for the third sector.
The overall practice implication of this is quite clear, however much we
may wish to dispel, deny or suppress it: To the extent that the command and
control hierarchy of the corporate firm and the government bureau becomes
the dominant norm of the third sector, any organizational case for a distinct,
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separate, or independent third sector simply dissolves. The long line of
defenders of independent, voluntary action and civil society stretching back
to Tocqueville and beyond did not have in mind nonprofit firms and rule-andpolicy based command and control hierarchies as essential training grounds
for democracy! They also conspicuously failed to delineate outcome measures
or best practice based upon efficiency and effectiveness as the sine qua non of
grassroots or any other voluntary association as a suitable basis for civil
society.
It is critically important, therefore, that we need to be asking if
bureaucratic organization is so pervasive in the contemporary third sector
because it is the best rational and most meaningful organizational solution of
the problem of voluntary social order among pluralities of persons pursuing
common purposes outside the home, the firm and the government bureau? Is
there, indeed, some perverse law of the universe dictating that the best
practice of government bureau policies and procedures is also the best
practice of nonprofit and voluntary organizations? Or are their other, more
sinister dynamics at work here?
In my view, the explanation for the contemporary bureaucratization of
third sector practice boils down to two primary factors: One is the
widespread, and largely oppressive presence of governmental
standardization, combined with similar pressures from foundations and
shortsighted donors. Mindful of the “magic lantern” theater that symbolized
the “velvet revolution” against bureaucratic Socialism in the late 1980’s (Ash,
1990), one often wants to say to nonprofit bureaucrats, “lighten up!” There is
no rule or policy that will, of itself, solve the profound human problems with
which the sector at its best is concerned. The other and more vexing
dimension involves very real failures of human imagination. Far too many
people in the sector allegedly noted for its programmatic imagination and
creativity are unable or unwilling to move beyond convention and precedent.
Both of these factors constitute strong forces for what has become an
important form of third sector inauthenticity in our time – using third sector
forms and norms, even while subverting the resulting enterprises for other
governmental and corporate purposes.

The Irony of Bureaucratization
Bureaucratic domination in the third sector at this point in history is
extremely ironic: It has arisen as a sort of counter-revolution in the wake of
at least a century of an abundance of social science pointing up the very real
existence of what have been variously called such things as democratic social
organization, participatory management, social (as opposed to rational or
formal) organization, community organization, informal organization, nonhierarchical order, open systems, and even spontaneous or emergent order and
self-constituting systems. The greatest import of this entire tradition is that
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rigid command and control hierarchies and highly prescriptive policy are not
essential to getting results. There are other, and often better, ways; ways
which rely on social interaction, group process, and a wide variety of informal
social control mechanisms that the literature of sociology, anthropology and
social psychology and other fields have documented in abundance. At the
same time, sporadic calls for “alternative organization” models
notwithstanding, the practice of the third sector doesn’t seem able to isolate
from this vast literature any particularly persuasive models adequate to
justify trustworthy practice grounded in this knowledge.
As a result in the vast majority of cases contemporary practice in the third
sector is a kind of resigned, or world-weary “bureaucratic realism” (which is
to say, no realism at all). Bureaucracy in this sense is a double-binding world
of practice in which obvious oxymorons like ‘paid volunteers’ make perfect
sense.
Every one of us who practices in even a small corner of the bureaucratic
third sector deals regularly with the bureaucratic realism of the third sector.
In fact, most of us have become thoroughly inured to the absurdities
bureaucracy so often presents. The results are at times laughably absurd and
at other times literally tragic. Until the federal government called a halt to it,
my state like many others had a practice of defining child abuse as a crime
under its criminal statutes and simultaneously as a disease in order to cover
child abuse service contracts under Medicaid. Presently, the emphasis on
bureaucratic “accountability” is transforming untold numbers of nonprofit
organizations whose record collection is supposedly secondary to their service
delivery missions into record-keeping engines able to provide a modicum of
service as a side light.
We know from Joseph Heller, Key Kesey, and myriad other twentieth
century authors that such practices are precisely the sort of thing
bureaucratic organization results in when it confronts the complexities and
subtleties of the life world. We know from authors such as Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, Aldus Huxley, George Orwell, and Franz Kafka that they have
numerous other, more sinister dimensions as well. Far too often, it can be
said of contemporary nonprofit practitioners: We have become the people they
warned us about! Virtually anyone who has spent any time around nonprofit
service firms could construct their own extensive critique of bureaucratic
practice in the third sector, detailing the absurdities and irrationality of
supposedly rational organization. Bureaucracy has many observers and few
defenders. So what are we to do?

Colonization of the Third Sector
It is not an exaggeration to say that the third sector has become a
principal front in what, borrowing from Habermas, we can call the vanishing
public sphere and the colonization of the life world. (Habermas, 1984)
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Through many media including professionalized services, social policy, legal
sanctions, ADLs, hospices, day care and publicly purchased services, publicly
funded nonprofit services have brought the state directly into managing the
daily lives of millions of people, categorizing and testing them, recognizing
and disqualifying them, labeling and stigmatizing them in the name of
bureaucraticized compassion. I am not among those who find these objectives
themselves objectionable. My concern is primarily with how we – whether
welfare staters, liberals or compassionate conservatives – insist that the
bureaucratic intrusions of policy, procedures, rules, command and control
into the everyday lives of other people offer the only possible principia media
for pursuing such noble objectives.
Even through I am a party to and intimately involved in the bureaucratic
third sector, as a board member, licensed social worker, community
organizer, administrator, teacher, mentor, researcher, volunteer, donor and
perhaps in other ways, my work on the concept of the commons has been
directed and informed by the recognition that there must be more to it than
that. A third sector conceived only as the context for bureaucratic service
delivery at arms length from government is a conception scarcely worth
having.

Conclusion
Creating plausible alternatives to the continued colonization of the
lifeworlds of the third sector should be a major focus of the practice of the
commons in the future. The continued gradual spread of corporate and public
bureaucratization as we have seen it over the past several decades may do
much to prop up the legitimacy of government, or soften the hard edges of
capitalism. However, the continuing extension of rule-based hierarchies
based in the command and control tactics of policy and procedure into the
third sector – the traditional domain of public speech, religion, protest and
independent common action – represents nothing positive with respect to the
advancement of democracy and human freedom. For the latter, we must look
to the practice of the commons – joining with others in shared purposes,
pooling our resources, building social capital and defining shared moral
orders.
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